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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
STATUTORY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE GAMBLING
NUISANCE IN LOUISIANA
Louisiana Act 120 of 1940 was a radical innovation in the use
of the ex parte restraining order. It amended a previous statute1
which authorized the abatement of a gambling establishment as
a public nuisance by providing that
"where a petition is filed under this act and such petition is
supported by the ex parte affidavits of two reputable citizens
sworn to before any officer authorized by law to administer
oaths to affidavits, detailing matters within such affiants'
knowledge and clearly establishing the existence of a nuisance
as defined in Section 1 of this act, the, court to whom such
petition and affidavits is presented shall forthwith issue a
temporary restraining order, to be in force until the hearing
on the rule to show cause under Section 5 of this act; and
said temporary restraining order shall prohibit the use of the
place where said nuisance is averred to exist for any purpose,
or purposes, whatsoever, pending the trial and determination
of the said rule to show cause." (Italics supplied.)
Several nice questions have arisen in connection with the ex
parte procedures authorized by this statute. In Dupuy v. Tedora
the district judge refused to accept ex parte affidavits submitted
according to the terms of the act on the ground that the court
personally knew it was being done for purely selfish and political
reasons. The supreme court, on application for writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, without passing on the constitution-
ality of the act, said, "'all courts shall be open, and every person
for injury done him . . . shall have adequate remedy by due
process of law and justice administered without denial, partiality
or unreasonable delay.' . . . The refusal of a judge to permit a
citizen to come into his court for the purpose of having his cause
heard and decided because in his opinion the citizen has no case
... is a clear violation of the Constitutional mandate that 'All
courts shall be open' . . . The 'due process of law' provision in the
Constitution is designed to include oppression and arbitrary
1. La. Act 49 of 1938, as amended by La. Act 120 of 1940 [Dart's Crim.
Stats. (1943) § 10261. The original statute, La. Act 192 of 1920, enacted for
the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Art. 188, La. Const. of 1913,
contained language identical with that of the 1940 anti-gambling statute.
2. 204 La. 560, 15 So.(2d) 886 (1943).
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power from every branch of the government." This decision
made it clear that the court must issue the temporary restraining
order where the required affidavits are filed and cannot, of its
own volition and accord, refuse the relief sought until after a
hearing on the merits.
In Womack v. Varnado4 the district judge granted the injunc-
tion as prayed for according to the ex parte procedure set out in
the anti-gambling statute. The supreme court sustained the
action without ruling on the constitutionality of the procedure
since the question had not beeri raised in district court.'
The real test of the validity of the new procedure came in
the case of Mongogna v. O'Dwyer.6 The plaintiffs filed a petition,
supported by ex parte affidavits, declaring O'Dwyer's establish-
ment to be a gambling house and asking that it be closed. As
pointed out in a prior case,7 the 1940 amendment, in express terms,
made mandatory the issuance of a restraining order pending a
hearing on the rule to show cause why the alleged nuisance,
created by defendant, should not be abated and an injunction
issued to prohibit its continuance. Is this procedure a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution? Does it deprive the
trial judge of his discretionary powers by compelling him to close
a business without a hearing? Does it delegate an exclusive
judicial function to private citizens? These questions were
answered in the affirmative by the supreme court when it
declared the new ex parte injunctive proceedings unconstitu-
tional.
Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee that prop-
erty shall not be taken without due process of law. Under the
3. 204 La. 560, 573, 15 So.(2d) 886, 890, citing La. Const. of 1921i Art I, § 6,
and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 4 Wheat. 518, 4
L.Ed. 629 (1819).
4. 204 La. 1019, 16 So.(2d) 825 (1943).
5. However, the court stated by way of dictum that "if it be assumed
arguendo, however, that said Section 10 of Act 120 of 1940 is unconstitutional,
the remainder of the statute would not necessarily fall because of that.
Where an unconstitutional portion of a statute is inseparable from the
remaining provisions, the entire law is invalid .... But if the constitutional
parts of a statute are independent of the invalid portion, the former will be
permitted to stand .... Should section 10 be stricken from the statute, the
remaining portion would be complete in itself and capable of being enforced
in accordance with the intention of the Legislature to suppress gambling."
204 La. 1019, 1029, 16 So.(2d) 825, 828. See also City of Alexandria v. Hall,
171 La. 595, 131 So. 722 (1930); State v. Bbnner, 193 La. 402, 190 So. 626 (1939);
Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 416, 5 So.(2d) 531 (1941); Ricks v. State Depart-
ment of Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 So.(2d) 49 (1942); Ricks v. Close, 201 La.
242, 9 So.(2d) 534 (1942).
6. 204 La. 1030, 15 So.(2d) 829 (1943).
7. Dupuy v. Tedora, 204 La. 560, 15 So.(2d) 886 (1943).
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art I, § 2; U.S. Const. Amend. IV, § 1.
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procedure authorized by the 1940 statute the operator of a sup-
posedly legitimate business would have no defense until trial,
and it is highly probable that he would suffer irreparable damage
as a result of the temporary restraining order. If a mistake had
been made by the affiants in declaring the establishment to be
a gambling house, when in reality it was a legitimate business,
the operator would have no recourse until the trial were held
and the matter determined by the court. He might then be
placed at a substantial disadvantage in his attempt to' regain
his former customers, many of whom would not return because
of the circumstances surrounding the closing of the business. A
procedure which makes such injury possible is inconsistent with
the duty of the state to protect its citizens who are engaged in
legitimate businesses. The supreme court correctly decided that
the power granted to private citizens under the act was clearly
a usurpation of the powers and duties of the judiciary.
An examination of the statutes of several states failed to
disclose any similar enactments.9 However, it is significant to
note, by way of analogy, that a corresponding New York law"0
expressly requires that the restraining order may be granted only
after due notice. This provision was inserted in order to elimi-
nate the inherent hardships of the ex parte procedure, particular-
ly with reference to labor disputes. Wisconsin"' prohibits all ex
parte injunctive orders in industrial disputes. Minnesota 2 pro-
vides for ex parte injunctive procedure only if violence to prop-
erty is threatened. Not one of the statutes" examined require the
courts, on being petitioned, to issue forthwith a temporary re-
straining order, as required by the act under discussion. It is
also significant that even during the existence of the National
Prohibition Act,1" when legislatures throughout the country
were authorizing the famous Padlock Injunctions, no ex parte
procedure so far-reaching was authorized.
The ex parte procedures declared unconstitutional by the
court in Mongogna v. O'Dwyer"5 applied only to gambling nuis-
ances and are to be distinguished from the general temporary
restraining order which is issued in cases where an injunction is
9. New York, California, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, Florida, Nevada
and Wisconsin.
10. New York, Civil Practices Act, § 882, as amended by c. 378 of 1930.
11. Wis. Stat. (1929) § 113.07.
12. Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 4256.
13. Note (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 1184.
14. 41 Stat. 405 (1919), 27 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1940).
15. 204 La. 1030, 16 So.(2d) 829 (1943).
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sought and the court is satisfied that irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant before a hearing on the merits
of the case."" The issuance of such a temporary restraining order
has been held to rest in the discretion of the trial court.'7 The
temporary restraining order is issued for the primary purpose of
maintaining the status quo pending a hearing on the application
for a temporary injunction.
CRAWFORD H. DOWNS
16. Art. 297, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 29 of
1924, § 2 [Dart's State. (1941) § 2079].
17. Snowden v. Red River and Bayou Des Gailses Levee and Drainage
District, 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389 (1931).
